The applicant challenged a decision depriving him of his British citizenship and excluding him from the United Kingdom because of his alleged involvement and link to terrorist-related activities. After failing in his appeals to the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Special Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the applicant complained to the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) under Articles 8 and 14. The Court rejected all of the applicant’s complaints, finding them to be manifestly ill-founded, and declared the application inadmissible.
The Ministry of Interior requested for the decision concerning the recognition of the respondent’s stateless status, be overturned. The case on appeal raised two points of principle: first, the burden of proof applicable to the determination of whether a person qualifies for stateless status, as defined in the 1954 Convention; and secondly, the consideration of stateless persons as a particular category of aliens comparable to beneficiaries of international protection. The Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal’s previous decision and ordered the Tribunal for a new assessment of the applicant’s status.
This case concerned an appeal as to whether an applicant for subsidiary protection may be considered both as a national of a third country and a stateless person simultaneously under the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006 and the Qualification Directive. The Court held that a person who is a national of a state is not a stateless person and that such state or country is his country of origin in relation to which his application must be primarily decided.
The applicant, of Palestinian origin, applied for stateless status, arguing that Spain does not recognise Palestine as a State. The Supreme Court rejected her application arguing that many countries in the international community recognise Palestine as a state, implying that Palestine provided the applicant with protection.
In 2012, the applicant received a guarantee that he would receive Croatian citizenship if he would renounce his UK nationality, and he proceeded with the renunciation. In 2013, criminal proceedings against the applicant were initiated, and his naturalisation application was thus postponed and subsequently, after the criminal conviction, rejected - leaving him stateless. The Court ruled against the applicant, finding that naturalisation is a discretionary power of the state and not a right of an individual, and that all the naturalisation requirements, including renunciation of previous nationality and lack of criminal record, need to be met cumulatively for a successful naturalisation.
The applicant was born in Yugoslavia on the territory of Croatia, to parents who were born on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicant's birth registration erroneously included an entry "Muslim", which was subsequently crossed out and replaced by a reference to his origin from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicant argued that he should have been registered as a Croatian national at birth, just like his brother was, and that denial of Croatian nationality status would mean that he became stateless after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Applicants requested to be recognised as stateless in addition to having already been recognised as refugees. The judgments deals with the question of whether refugee status is comparable in rights to the status of nationals within the meaning of the exclusion clause in Article 1(2) of the 1954 Convention. The Court sides with the applicants confirming their right to be recognised as stateless persons in addition to having been granted asylum-based residence status.
This case concerns an applicant who sought to quash the decision of the respondent which refused to revoke a deportation order made in respect of the applicant. The respondent contended that the applicant had been untruthful throughout the asylum process about his nationality and was therefore not entitled to any relief, while the applicant contended that the applicant’s untruthfulness should not be a bar to relief as substantial grounds established that a real risk to the applicant's life or freedom was inevitable. The Court found in favour of the applicant and quashed the decision of the respondent refusing to revoke the deportation order.
The applicant was born in Azerbaijan to an Armenian father and an Azeri mother, and subsequently lived in Russia and Belarus before arriving in France. His stateless status application was rejected as he did not demonstrate having made repeated and diligent attempts at getting recognised as a national by Russia, Armenia or Azerbaijan. The Court upheld the administrative decision.
Applicant's Ukrainian nationality was withdrawn on the basis of voluntary acquisition of Canadian nationality. The applicant argued, among others, that he was not a Canadian national at the time of withdrawal of his Ukrainian nationality, and that he became stateless as a result of the withdrawal. Court dismissed his arguments as he did not provide sufficient evidence as to the circumstances of loss of his Canadian nationality.
Procedural aspects of statelessness determination should be the same as in the asylum application procedure, as the SPD procedure is not specified in national law. This means that the deadline for issuing a decision on statelessness is 6 months with the possibility of extension.
A child (MK) was born in the UK in 2010 and her parents were both nationals of India. MK had made an application for registration as a British citizen. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 of the British Nationality Act 1981 requires that the child 'is and always has been stateless'. The key issue was whether, in order to be considered stateless, the child was required to have sought (and failed) to acquire the nationality of her parents. The Court determined that there was no requirement to have sought the nationality of the parents, and MK was, if she met the other relevant requirements, entitled to register as a British citizen, as she was and always had been stateless at the date of the relevant Home Office decision. Further, the Secretary of State could require an applicant to prove the relevant facts, but could not lawfully 'impose requirements that cannot, or practically cannot, be met'.
The applicant was born in Georgia and moved to Leningrad before the breakup of the Soviet Union, where he was educated and got married. He was never able to exchange his Soviet passport for a Russian passport, was ordered to be expelled while the expulsion was not possible due to his statelessness. His attorney has repeatedly appealed the deportation ruling but in vain.
The decision changed judicial practice and provided a legal ground for the release of stateless persons from detention, even though the amendments to the legislation ordered by the Constitutional Court are still pending (as of May 2021).
The family applied for statelessness determination, claiming to be stateless since they were not able to receive identity documents from any state, despite trying for years, and were not recognised by any state. The authorities rejected the application for statelessness determination with the argument that they did not fulfil their duty to cooperate. The lack of any form of documentation is interpreted as a sign for the lack of credibility and willingness to cooperate rather than a possible indication of statelessness. The Federal Administrative Court upheld the decision arguing that the applicants had not demonstrated that they had undertaken the necessary steps to receive identity documents. The situation of the children is not examined separately. Arguments relating to the best interests of the child are not discussed.