- 207 results found
This appeal arose from decisions of first and second respondents to refuse the appellant’s application for an Irish passport on the basis that he is not an Irish citizen. The appellant’s passport application was on grounds of automatic birth right citizenship derived through the residence of his father, an Afghan national, who gave false information on his initial refugee application in the State. The Court of Appeal had decided in favour of the Minister, holding that a declaration of refugee status which is revoked on the basis that the applicant had provided false and misleading information leads to the declaration being void ab initio.
The Supreme Court allowing the appeal, held that while a refugee declaration is ‘‘in force’’ and until such time as it is revoked, it must be regarded as being valid. This was based on the fact that the Minister for Justice has a discretion as to whether or not to revoke and is only required to do so when it is considered appropriate. This discretion would have enabled the Minister for Justice in an appropriate case to consider the effect of a decision to revoke on those who obtained derivative rights prior to revocation. The Court held that residence status conferred by the State on a parent based on false or misleading information could be included for the calculation of the period required to confer an entitlement of citizenship on the appellant.
This case primarily concerns NB and her disabled minor son AB as well as her husband and other children, who are UNRWA-registered stateless Palestinians. Having previously resided in the Al Bass refugee camp in Lebanon, they arrived in the United Kingdom in 2015 and are seeking refugee status on the basis of Article 1(D) of the Geneva Convention. The Court considers whether they qualify to be granted ipso facto refugee status under Article 1(D) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
A Nigerian child was unable to apply British citizenship as she could not pay the full fee, fixed at £973 at the time. The UK Supreme Court found that setting high and unaffordable fees for registration as a British citizen is not unlawful, even though it acknowledged that for many young people the current level of fees is unaffordable and that the inability to acquire British citizenship may result in difficulties for young people. However, the Supreme Court found that the UK Parliament had empowered the Secretary of State to set such fees at a level exceeding the cost of processing a citizenship application and therefore setting such high fees was not unlawful.
This case concerns an Estonian national who renounced her nationality on the basis of an assurance that she would be granted Austrian nationality once proof of her renunciation was given. This assurance was revoked on the grounds that the applicant had committed road traffic offences, leaving the applicant stateless. In its judgment, the CJEU confirms that the situation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the ambit of EU law, and concluded that the authorities' decision to revoke an assurance to grant Austrian nationality was not compatible with the principle of proportionality.
The case concerned the refusal of the Bulgarian authorities to issue a birth certificate for the daughter of VMA and her wife as it the Bulgarian birth certificate could only recognise two parents of different sexes. The Bulgarian Administrative Court of the city of Sofia referred four questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, in relation to balancing the child’s rights under EU law and the Member States’ prerogative to pursue specific social policy in relation to parentage.
Article 12(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive, which provides for an exclusion ground from refugee status where the applicant benefits from protection or assistance from, inter alia, UNRWA, constitutes a lex specialis, and therefore requires an assessment of whether the applicant receives such assistance or protection. In addition, a person registered with UNRWA who receives effective protection or assistance from that agency in a third country which is not the territory of her habitual residence but which forms part of the area of operations of that agency must be considered as enjoying sufficient protection in that third country in accordance with Article 35 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and therefore may not obtain asylum in the EU. The Court lays down the conditions under which the applicant may be considered as enjoying sufficient protection in that third country.
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) allowed an appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deprive C3, C4 and C7 of their British citizenship, and found that the decision to deprive C3, C4 and C7 of their citizenship breached s.40(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981, as it would render the appellants stateless. On the date of the deprivation decision, it was found that C3, C4 and C7 did not have Bangladeshi citizenship under the law of Bangladesh and the Secretary of State therefore could not deprive them of their British citizenship.
The case concerns a stateless person of Palestinian origin refused asylum in Hungary. The question answered by the CJEU concerned the circumstances in which a person is considered to be receiving "protection or assistance from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than [UNHCR]" within the meaning of Article 12(1)(a) of 2004 Qualification Directive, and may therefore be entitled to refugee status when that protection or assistance ceases. The CJEU held that a person receives such protection or assistance when that person has actually availed themselves of that protection or assistance, and not if they are entitled to but have not done so.
The case concerned the removal of the applicant, a stateless Palestinian individual who had been habitually resident in Syria and present in the United Kingdom since 2007, to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). It was held by the – that the PNA could be considered as a safe third country despite it not being formally recognised as a state. It was also held that the Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection (the Qualification Directive), and for the content of the protection granted could not be interpreted as guaranteeing a resident permit to all those in receipt of subsidiary protection.
The applicant applied for British citizenship on the basis of s.4B of the British Nationality Act 1981 (which does not allow the grant of British citizenship when the applicant already has another nationality), relying on a letter from a Pakistani Consulate confirming that his Pakistani nationality was cancelled. The Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision, which had been in favour of the applicant, on the basis that (1) it failed to apply the principle that the person's nationality was to be determined by reference to the actual law of the state on the basis of expert evidence, not what agencies of the state might assert about that person's nationality; and (2) the lower court’s reading of Pakistani law was mistaken.
The communication concerned M.K.A.H., a stateless child, and centred around whether Switzerland violated his rights under Articles 2 (2), 6, 7, 16, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 37 and 39 UNCRC when it decided to return him and his mother back to Bulgaria, pursuant to the agreement between Switzerland and Bulgaria relating to the readmission of migrants in irregular situations, where they had previously obtained subsidiary protection.
Some of the findings of the Committee included: (i) Switzerland had not respected the best interests of the child nor heard him at the time of the hearing of the asylum request; (ii) the child ran a real risk of being subject to inhuman and degrading treatment in case of a return to Bulgaria; (iii) Switzerland had not sought to take the necessary measures to verify what access to nationality the child could benefit from in Bulgaria. Article 7 UNCRC implicates that States must take the necessary positive actions to implement the right to acquire nationality.
The applicant was born in the Russian Federation and his birth was not duly registered. Lacking identity documents and unable to prove his nationality, he was detained in Ukraine for the purpose of expulsion. The Court held that the authorities did not act diligently to contact the Russian embassy and obtain documentation to evidence the applicant's Russian citizenship, and failed to review the lawfulness of his detention and to provide an effective remedy, in violation of Article 5(1), (4) and (5).
The case concerns the interpretation of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU (hereafter recast Qualification Directive).
The applicant requested international protection in Germany as he no longer had access to protection from the UNRWA in Syria.
The national Court referred 5 questions to the CJEU to determine whether the applicant satisfied the conditions under Article 12(1) according to which, in essence, if the protection or assistance from UNWRA has ceased for any reason, without the position of persons receiving that protection or assistance being definitely settled, those persons are ipso facto entitled to the benefits of Directive 2011/95.
The case concerned the interpretation of Articles 2(f) and 15(c) of Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection (hereafter recast Qualification Directive).
The national court referred two questions, concerning: i) the interpretation of article 15(c) in respect of how the degree of arbitrary violence in an armed conflict should be measured and ii) whether the assessment as to the existence of a serious and individual threat should be conducted on the basis of a comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case or should be based on determined factors.
The Court held that the interpretation of Article 15(c) must preclude the use of the threshold of minimum civilian casualties as the only determining factor but should be based on a comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case.
The applicant is from Western Sahara and identifies as a Sahrawi, a territory occupied by Morocco. Having fled to France, he argued that he should qualify as a stateless person even though his birth certificate indicates that he has Moroccan nationality. He argued that this matter should be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
The applicant asked to be granted the status as a stateless person in France, however both the OFPRA (French bureau for the protection of refugees and stateless persons) and the Courts denied him this status on the grounds that he did not take sufficient steps to request nationality from the Armenian authorities. He also argued that people from Azerbaijan face discrimination and are often refused Russian nationality, even when they may be able to benefit from it. The Court concluded that no discrimination exists and the applicant failed to take steps to obtain Russian nationality.
The applicant, a stateless person residing in Hungary, faced protracted difficulties in regularising his legal situation, being eventually recognised as stateless after fiften years' residence. During thirteen of those years, the applicant had no legal status in Hungary and was entitled to neither healthcare nor employment, nor was he able to marry. The Court held that Hungary had not complied with its positive obligation to provide an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to have his status in Hungary determined with due regard to his private-life interests under Article 8 of the Convention and that there had been a violation of that Article.
A Palestinian refugee was living in Lebanon and benefited from the protection of UNRWA, before moving to and applying for statelessness status in France. The Conseil d’Etat quashed a decision to grant the applicant statelessness status because it did not mention whether the applicant no longer continued to benefit from UNRWA's effective protection. The Conseil d'Etat ruled on the conditions of eligibility of Palestinian refugees for statelessness status and identified three hypothesis in which a Palestinian refugee who is outside UNRWA's area of activity must be considered as no longer effectively benefiting from the protection or assistance of this agency.
The applicant, a Moroccan national who acquired French nationality, was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in 2013 for involvement in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts in France and other countries. He was deprived of his French nationality and was served with an expulsion order: despite requesting an interim measure under grounds of Article 3 ECHR he was returned to Morocco.
The applicant claimed, inter alia, that his removal violated his rights under Article 3 ECHR due to the risk that he would be exposed to ill-treatment in the event of his return and that his removal in breach of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) interim measure violated Article 34 ECHR.
The complainant, a Syrian Kurd with provisional refugee status in Switzerland, applied for recognition as stateless. Her application was rejected on the grounds that a) she was entitled to Syrian nationality and b) she was already protected by the Refugee Convention. On appeal, the court held that the complainant was entitled to apply for recognition as stateless notwithstanding her status as a refugee and that, since the complainant would have to travel to Syria to claim nationality there, she had adequate reasons for not claiming the nationality to which she had an entitlement and could be recognised as stateless.
The Dutch requirement that a child provide proof of lack of nationality in order to be recognised as stateless was a violation of Art 24 ICCPR. As a person registered with 'unknown nationality' the child could not benefit from international protections afforded to stateless children, including the right to acquire the nationality of the State in which they are born.
The case concerns the interpretation of Article 12(1)(a) of EU Directive 2004/83. The question before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was how to determine who should have access to guarantees provided by Article 12, and what those guarantees entailed. The CJEU held that individuals who had received protection from a non-High Commissioner for Refugees (‘HCR’) UN organisation, but ceased to receive this protection due to a reason beyond their control, should automatically be granted refugee status by a Member State unless they fall into one of the exceptions of Article 12.
The applicant challenged a decision depriving him of his British citizenship and excluding him from the United Kingdom because of his alleged involvement and link to terrorist-related activities. After failing in his appeals to the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Special Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the applicant complained to the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) under Articles 8 and 14. The Court rejected all of the applicant’s complaints, finding them to be manifestly ill-founded, and declared the application inadmissible.
After discovering that the applicant had omitted information when applying for Russian citizenship, his citizenship was annulled and an entry ban was enforced. In light of the far reaching consequences of this decision, and its apparent arbitrary nature, the Court held that the annulment interfered with the applicant's rights as guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, the expulsion of the applicant from Russian territory failed to respect the principle of proportionality, particularly given the lack of evidence of any threat to Russian national security posed by the applicant, thereby violating Article 8.
The Court held that it is not contrary to EU law for Member States to withdraw citizenship obtained by deception, even if the effect is to also withdraw citizenship of the Union, so long as the decision observes the principle of proportionality.