The authorities refused to examine the applications of Dutch nationals, with dual nationality of a non-EU country, for renewal of their Dutch passports. The decision was based on the fact that they had lost their Dutch nationality because they possessed a foreign nationality and had their principal residence for an uninterrupted period of 10 years outside the Netherlands and the EU. The CJEU found that Member States may lay down rules regulating the loss of their nationality and, as a result, the loss of EU citizenship, where the genuine link between the person and that State is durably interrupted. Nevertheless, the loss of nationality must respect the principle of proportionality, which requires an individual assessment of the consequences of that loss for the person from the point of view of EU law.
The claimant is a stateless person whose Romanian nationality was withdrawn by the National Citizenship Authority (“Autoritatea Nationala a Cetateniei”) on the grounds that he is known to have links with terrorist groups or has supported, in any form, or has committed other acts that endanger national security. Romania law provides that in such cases, the order issued by the National Citizenship Authority can be appealed in court, and the decision issued by this court is final and irrevocable. The claimant raises an objection of unconstitutionality with regard to this law, because it violates the principle of the double degree of jurisdiction provided for in the EU law in criminal matters, assimilating the matter in question with a criminal matter as defined by the EU law.
The applicant's Ukrainian nationality was withdrawn rendering him stateless, and subsequently a travel ban of 3 years was imposed on him due to a procedural violation of the border crossing rules. The applicant argued that the travel ban is disproportionate, that he enjoys lawful residence in Ukraine, has very close ties with Ukraine, and that the ban interferes with his right to challenge the deprivation of nationality which rendered him stateless in person in court.
The applicant was a Syrian national of Kurdish ethnicity, who unsuccessfully applied for asylum in Switzerland. He subsequently claimed that he has been deprived of Syrian nationality and therefore ought to be recognised as stateless. The State Secretariat for Migration and the Court decided that he did not meet the standard of proof to substantiate his statelessness of 'full proof'.
The applicant acquired Austrian nationality in 1995 and renounced her former Turkish nationality in 1996 as a condition for retaining the Austrian nationality. In 2018 the Austrian authorities declared that she has no longer been an Austrian national since 1997 as it appeared that she voluntarily re-acquired her Turkish nationality at that time, which is a ground for automatic loss of Austrian nationality. The Court set aside the determination of loss of Austrian nationality as it did not carry out a proportionality test on the basis of the Tjebbes judgment.
The applicant was issued an assurance that she will acquire Austrian nationality if she renounced her former Serbian nationality, which she did. However, after the assurance was issued the applicant committed a number of administrative offences, leading to the assurance being withdrawn after the renunciation of the former nationality has already taken place, resulting in the applicant's statelessness. The Court emphasised the constitutional significance of a letter of assurance of acquisition of nationality, and sided with the applicant.
The applicant acquired Austrian nationality by naturalisation in 1997, and renounced her Turkish nationality in that context. In 2018 it appeared that the applicant was listed on the voter registers for Turkish nationals abroad. She did not provide proof that she did not re-acquire Turkish nationality, and on that basis the Austrian authorities declared she has lost her Austrian nationality automatically due to acquisition of a foreign nationality.
The applicant naturalised in the Netherlands, after having derived his legal residence from being a partner of a Dutch resident. His naturalisation was later withdrawn, as it appeared he has concluded a marriage and fathered a child with another person in Egypt while still deriving residence rights from his relationship in the Netherlands. The Court confirmed the legality of withdrawal, despite the applicant becoming stateless as a result.
The applicant and his two children acquired Ukrainian nationality in 2004, on the basis of "territorial origin" provision. The acquisition was "cancelled" twelve years later on the basis of a statement by the applicant's (alleged) mother that the birth certificate submitted by the applicant in 2004 contained inaccurate information about his parentage. The Court sided with the applicant, maintaining that the accuracy of a birth certificate cannot be challenged on the mere basis of a statement, but also taking into consideration that the administrative decision rendered the applicant stateless in violation of national and international norms.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department appealed a decision to overturn two orders depriving E3 and N3 of their British citizenship. The issue raised by the appeal was whether the Secretary of State was precluded by section 40(4) of the 1981 Act from making the orders, because they rendered E3 and N3 stateless. The focus of the Court of Appeal’s judgment was whether the burden of proof concerning whether E3 and N3 would be rendered stateless following deprivation of their British citizenship fell on the Secretary of State or E3 and N3.
The author of the communication fled with her family from Uzbekistan to the Netherlands. After their asylum application got denied by the Dutch authorities, she was told that she had lost her Uzbek citizenship because she had not registered with the Uzbek Embassy within five years of leaving the country. Various application for social and child benefits got rejected by various national courts. The author maintains that she has exhausted domestic remedies with regard to her claims of violations of her right to family life and non-discrimination and of the rights of her child. The author submits that,by denying her application for a child budget, the State party violated her and Y’s rights under articles 23(1), 24(3) and 26, read in conjunction with articles 23(1) and 24(1), of the Covenant, as well as Y’s rights under article 24(1) including minors. In light of the level of vulnerability of the child and the inability of the mother to provide for the child, the Committee concluded that the State party has the obligation to ensure the child's physical and psychological well-being are protected. By not doing so, the State violated the child's rights under article 24(1).