The applicant is a dual Dutch/Moroccan national whose Dutch nationality was withdrawn on the basis of a criminal conviction for terrorist activities. The Court rejected the applicant's appeal, concluding, among others, that prevention of statelessness is a valid reason for differentiated treatment between those with a single and with multiple nationalities, and that withdrawal of nationality is not a punitive measure. Withdrawal of nationality in addition to the criminal sentence does not violate the principle that prohibits repeated punishments for the same action.
The applicant was born in the US, and his birth certificate indicated a Polish national as the father, and an unknown surrogate mother as the mother. Polish authorities refused to confirm the applicant acquired Polish nationality at birth as a child of a Polish parent, because the birth certificate is against the Polish public order, in particular the prohibition of surrogacy. The courts ruled in favour of the applicant, stating that confirmation of his Polish nationality on the basis of the birth certificate does not amount to validation of surrogacy.
The applicant is a dual Moroccan-Dutch nationality, whose Dutch nationality was withdrawn as a consequence of his involvement in a terrorist organisation. The applicant argued that the legal ground for withdrawing nationality only affects dual nationals, who are almost always Dutch nationals with a non-Western background, and thus constitutes discrimination prohibited by the ECHR. The Court ruled that prevention of statelessness is a sufficient and objective justification of this distinction, and the distinction is therefore justified.
The author of the communication fled with her family from Uzbekistan to the Netherlands. After their asylum application got denied by the Dutch authorities, she was told that she had lost her Uzbek citizenship because she had not registered with the Uzbek Embassy within five years of leaving the country. Various application for social and child benefits got rejected by various national courts. The author maintains that she has exhausted domestic remedies with regard to her claims of violations of her right to family life and non-discrimination and of the rights of her child. The author submits that,by denying her application for a child budget, the State party violated her and Y’s rights under articles 23(1), 24(3) and 26, read in conjunction with articles 23(1) and 24(1), of the Covenant, as well as Y’s rights under article 24(1) including minors. In light of the level of vulnerability of the child and the inability of the mother to provide for the child, the Committee concluded that the State party has the obligation to ensure the child's physical and psychological well-being are protected. By not doing so, the State violated the child's rights under article 24(1).